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„The Government will continue to reject tax harmonisation and favour fair 
tax competition, recognising that in a global economy such harmonisation 
would impede economic growth, and not promote it.“
UK Government, April 20041
„A more co-ordinated approach at the EU level and more effective 
administrative co-operation between Member States could signiﬁcantly 
improve the performance of tax systems ... helping to ensure more revenue is 
collected.“
European Commission, October 20052
Introduction
The dispute about tax harmonisation is not a mere technical issue but goes to the 
heart of the structure and purpose of the European Union (EU).
Without entering into the debate about the precise constitutional position of 
the EU, in loose terms it is a collective of Member States.  Each of the States is 
sovereign, with its own laws and constitutional arrangements, but they act toge-
ther in a variety of ways through the EU. This gives rise to EU-level law, imposed 
on the Member States either in speciﬁc areas (through Directives or Regulations) 
or generally through the Treaties (which have a quasi-constitutional status).
In theory the EU could lead to a beneﬁcial diversity; different Member States 
could follow different paths, which would enable them to cater for different ci-
tizen preferences and allow best practice to emerge from the variety.  This would 
result in reasonably efﬁcient inter-jurisdictional competition, because the Treaty-
protected freedoms of movement3 would remove many of the common barriers to 
cross-border relocation and so permit individuals and businesses to move to the 
State whose policy mix best suited them.
1  „Prospects for the EU in 2004“, para 36, Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce White Paper, Cm6174, 
April 2004.
2  European values in the globalised world, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 
525 (ﬁnal), Brussels, 20th October 2005.
3  Of people, goods and capital.
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Alternatively the EU could have an institutional bias towards harmonisation, 
with laws increasingly being adopted at the EU rather than national level, and 
imposed uniformly throughout the Union (either by directly effect or indirectly 
through compulsory implementation by Member States‘ institutions). Over time 
this would reduce the areas of national autonomy and so restrict diversity.
Without entering into the wider argument over which of these two alterna-
tives is the dominant one in current law and practice, there is a political ﬁction 
that taxation is at least partially protected from the harmonising process. On tax 
matters the electorates of Member States are said to be free to choose their own 
ﬁscal priorities. As the UK government said in its commentary on the draft EU 
constitution:
 „the right of Member States to determine their own tax policies is a fundamental 
one“4
This is seen as being a generally agreed position, although recent pronounce-
ments by the EU Commission perhaps do not accept the full implications of the 
UK government‘s case; as the Commission stated in its brieﬁng to the Hampton 
Court summit in 2005:
 „Responsibility for determining most aspects of taxation policy and setting tax 
rates remains ﬁrmly with Member States.“5
Note that it is now only „most“ aspects of tax policy over which Member 
States retain control, not all; even this politically sensitive area, the bedrock of 
national sovereignty, is now explicitly said to be at least partially subject to the 
drive towards harmonisation.
Why is this pluralistic approach to tax matters being diluted? What has chan-
ged the tax debate at the EU level is the new fear that there is a serious threat 
to the socio-economic model adopted (to a greater or lesser degree) by all EU 
governments. Although there are differences between Member States, all have a 
large Welfare State, with signiﬁcant redistribution and levelling of income and a 
high level of State-provided services. The EU governments do not see this simila-
rity as accidental, but as a fundamental feature of European life. The Commission 
4  „A Constitutional Treaty for the EU“, para. 76, Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce White Paper, 
Cm5934, September 2003.
5  European values in the globalised world, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 
525 (ﬁnal), Brussels, 20th October 2005.
is being increasingly explicit in its defence of this ‚European Social Model‘, and 
increasingly dogmatic about its shape:
• „national economic and social policies are built on shared values such as soli-
darity and cohesion, ... adequate health and safety, ... universal education and 
healthcare ... a choice in favour of a social market economy“6
• „European citizens have greater expectations of the state than their equivalents 
in Asia or America. The public sector tends to play a big role, either through 
regulation or government spending“7
So fundamental is this ‚European Social Model‘ to the governing class‘s view 
of the EU that it was to have been set out in the European Constitution which in 
its draft (now rejected in two national referenda) deﬁned not so much the process 
by which EU law was to be made and decisions taken but the end result.
However despite its perceived centrality to European life, this European Social 
Model is now seen to be failing signiﬁcant groups of citizens, and is said to be 
endangered by globalisation. Creating a high-cost, high-regulation model with 
high welfare payments has driven jobs to more ﬂexible economies, creating unac-
ceptably high levels of unemployment (now up to 19 million across the EU8), and 
the strong employment laws, which protect those already in work, have pushed 
the burden of this onto the young.
It is therefore not certain that this consensus amongst the European political 
class in favour of the old social model extends to all of the citizens of the EU. 
Some of the current problems in Europe, not only the highly visible civil disorder 
in France but also matters such as low voter turnout and the admitted low levels 
of qualiﬁcation amongst the young (and the exit of those who are qualiﬁed to 
the USA)9 may be evidence of increasing rejection of the post-War consensus by 
the new generation.
6  European values in the globalised world, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 
525 (ﬁnal), Brussels, 20tth October 2005.
7  European values in the globalised world, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 
525 (ﬁnal), Brussels, 20th October 2005.
8  European values in the globalised world, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 
525 (ﬁnal), Brussels, 20th October 2005.
9  European values in the globalised world, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 
525 (ﬁnal), Brussels, 20th October 2005.
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The political class however appears determined to preserve the status quo, 
and it is clear that the Commission, far from allowing diversity to lead to choice 
and inter-State competition, sees Member States as having autonomy only within 
the deﬁned limits of the common ﬁxed European Social Model.
This fear of change has serious implications for tax policy in the EU, and it is 
this desire to preserve the old Welfare State that has caused the shift in EU-le-
vel tax policy from relative autonomy for Member States to the openly expressed 
desire for tax harmonisation. A Welfare State at the levels seen in the EU requires 
high taxes for its funding, and this is reﬂected in the tax rates seen, particularly 
in the ‚old‘ Member States.
This does not mean that tax levels are the same throughout the EU; Ireland‘s 
tax revenues (as a share of GDP) are comparable to the USA, Spain and Portugal 
are both below the supposedly low-tax UK, and even France and Belgium have 
comparatively low tax rates - even if only when compared with Sweden. However 
there does appear to be a general consensus amongst EU Member States that the 
government should spend roughly 40 % of GDP, to fund its high levels of social 
intervention.
In the past the relative autonomy of Member States has led to variety, and 
so to ‚tax competition‘. Because there have been different tax systems within the 
EU, and citizens have been free to move to take advantage of more favourable 
regimes, governments have been forced to consider the wider effects of their tax 
policies as well as their revenue-raising potential. This does not mean that tax 
levels have been reduced in the EU (the so-called ‚race to the bottom‘ as govern-
ments successively reduce their tax rates in an attempt to attract people and ca-
pital); on the contrary, average tax rates have risen. However it may well mean 
that the rate of increase has been lower than it would otherwise have been, and 
it certainly seems to have changed the mix of taxes, with taxes on capital (seen as 
being more mobile and therefore more responsive to tax competition) remaining 
static while taxes on labour and consumption have increased.
This ‚tax competition‘ causes two problems for EU governments. In the short 
term it can lead to loss of tax revenues for high-tax countries, as their citizens 
take advantage of lower rates elsewhere in the EU. More importantly, in the longer 
term it acts as a constraint on their future tax raising powers; if some EU Member 
States raise their taxes and others do not, the tax raising states would suffer an 
outﬂow of workers and capital (so that an increase in tax rates may even result 
in a decrease in tax revenues collected).
As seen above, the Commission is explicit in its aims and motives; tax policy 
is to be harmonised to avoid this tax competition, to maximise Member States‘ 
revenue-raising potential in order to prop up at all costs the failing social model 
of the extensive Welfare State.
The mechanism for this is to elevate the desire to maintain the status quo of 
the social model, with its high levels of social security payments, so that it beco-
mes an overriding policy objective of the EU, with a quasi-constitutional position. 
The theoretical autonomy of Member States‘ governments over their internal tax 
policies will be subject to this requirement to protect the Social Model, which 
will result in a movement towards harmonisation and other measures designed 
to prevent tax competition.
But if the supposed freedom of Member State governments, and indirectly their 
citizens, to set their own tax policies is no longer seen as being a suitable policy 
objective, what practical impact is this having on taxation within the EU?
Current tax harmonisation in the European Union10 
It is not generally acknowledged in the political debate, but in fact taxes are al-
ready harmonised and imposed at the EU level, and indeed have been for some 
time. The process began many years ago with indirect taxes, particularly VAT where 
the tax system is set at the EU level. It is compulsory for all EU Member States to 
adopt VAT, in the form and under the rules prescribed11, and charge it on all sales 
except those that the EU permits to be exempt.
Two arguments are used to claim that this does not amount to an EU-imposed 
tax, and that the power of national parliaments over tax is retained.
The ﬁrst argument is that although the system of VAT is imposed by the EU, 
the rates are not, and so the decision to charge tax, and how much, is therefore 
still the prerogative of national parliaments.
10  For more on the current status of tax harmonisation in the EU, see Teather, R., „Locking in high 
tax rates“, Journal of the New Europe, Centre for the New Europe, Brussels, 2(1) 2005, pp 33-
48.
11  Currently the „6th Directive on the harmonisation of the laws of member states relating to 
turnover taxes“, Dir 77/388 (1977).
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The second argument is that EU decisions on tax still require unanimity, and 
therefore an EU decision to tax is in fact a decision by each national government. 
Indeed the UK government, in its commentary on the constitutional treaty ne-
gotiations, cited this requirement for unanimity as proof that it has successfully 
resisted tax harmonisation:
 „The Government committed itself in the September 2003 White Paper (para-
graph 76) to ensure that tax matters would continue to be decided by unanimity, 
in line with its manifesto commitment. This commitment has been delivered 
upon. The Convention‘s proposals that certain aspects of indirect and company 
taxation could be adopted by qualiﬁed majority voting have been deleted.“12
Unfortunately these arguments are not valid; the ﬁrst is untrue, and the se-
cond is insufﬁcient to ensure national democratic control.
Firstly, tax rates are imposed at the EU level; the 6th Directive on VAT sets 
minimum VAT rates of 15 % as a standard rate and 5 % as a reduced rate13 for 
favoured products.14 It is therefore unlawful for an EU Member State to reduce 
its VAT levels below this point, and so tax could be imposed by the EU against the 
wishes of a national government.15
Moreover, this is not just a theoretical provision; it has already inﬂicted tax 
on UK taxpayers. In 1997 the UK Parliament voted to charge VAT at the full rate 
on domestic fuel and power16 (it had previously enjoyed a preferential 0 % rate17). 
Later in the same year Parliament desired to restore the 0 % rate, but was unable 
to do so because although the EU Directive permits historic lower rates of VAT 
to remain as a ‚transitional‘ measure, it forbids any new products to be added 
12  UK Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce, „White Paper on the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe“, Cm6309, September 2004.
13  6th Directive on the harmonisation of the laws of member states relating to turnover taxes“, Dir 
77/388, paragraph 12(3).
14  In addition, the products favoured by being taxed at reduced rates must come from approved 
categories listed in Annex H of the Directive.
15  Admittedly these provisions are currently temporary, being imposed for 5 years at a time.
16  Finance Act 1997.
17  This ‚zero-rating‘ is partly a mechanism by which the UK government avoided the EU prohibi-
tion on exempting any products and services from VAT other than those on an approved list; 
technically VAT is charged, but at the rate of 0 %. It is also more beneﬁcial than exemption, in 
that businesses making supplies of zero-rated products are able to reclaim VAT paid on their 
costs, so removing all VAT from the supply chain.
to the list or for products to return to a lower rate once their rate has (however 
temporarily) been increased. VAT is therefore charged on domestic fuel at 5 % in 
the UK, the lowest rate permitted under the EU Directive.18
Taxes are therefore imposed by the EU. Of course this minimum tax initially 
had to be unanimously agreed by the governments of the Member States, which 
is the second argument against the claims that the EU now has taxing rights.  Ho-
wever this defence is only valid immediately, not temporally; the initial adoption 
of a tax rate needs to be unanimous, and so may not involve a transfer of taxing 
rights from national governments to the EU, but once that agreement has been 
reached national parliaments are unable to change their tax rates unilaterally. 
The citizens of a Member State are therefore unable to reduce their tax rates be-
low the level prescribed by the EU, even if they elect a new government for that 
precise purpose, unless their government can persuade all other Member States‘ 
governments to agree.
Effectively this allows governments to bind in their successors to high tax 
rates, by agreeing to an EU minimum tax that cannot then be lowered without 
unanimous agreement across the EU. This ﬂouts the basic democratic principle 
that future governments cannot be bound (except by a constitutional provision, 
which usually requires a super-majority or referendum), and so the use of the EU 
to impose taxes grants powers to current governments that should rightly belong 
to future electorates.19
The EU has therefore, at least in part, gained the ability to impose taxes; Mem-
ber State citizens are unable to vote for a national government that can reduce 
their VAT levels below the EU minimum. If they did so then legal action would be 
taken against that country‘s government through the European Court of Justice, 
either by the Commission itself or by businesses from other states which were 
made less competitive by the ‚unlawful‘ tax reduction.
At the root of this harmonisation is the fear of tax competition and loss of 
revenue, particularly by the high-tax countries. This was exacerbated by the in-
troduction of the Single Market in 1992, which was meant to enable EU citizens 
and businesses to treat the whole of the Union as a single trading territory.
18  Finance (No. 2) Act 1997, s6.
19  There is a further constitutional problem, that EU decisions are generally made by government 
ministers whereas taxes generally have to be set by parliaments.
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Theoretically there are two main options for charging VAT on international 
activities, giving taxing rights to either the system of the country where the sup-
plier is based (the „origin system“) or that of the country where the customer is 
based (the „destination system“). In practice around the world VAT and similar 
taxes generally all use the destination system for the bulk of transactions, not 
particularly a result of co-ordination (although it is the method adopted by the 
IMF‘s model tax code), but merely because the purpose of VAT - as a consumption 
tax - makes it more logical for the tax to be levied where the consumption takes 
place, presumably in most cases the country of residence of the consumer.
For cross-border trading within the EU however, the Commission‘s desire to 
promote the Single Market and remove barriers to inter-Member activity led to a 
different approach, which resulted in a conﬂict with Member States‘ governments‘ 
agenda of enforcing compliance and preventing tax competition.
As the Single Market legislation opened up Europe‘s internal borders and al-
lowed the free movement of goods throughout the EU, the Commission wanted 
the „origin principle“ to apply within the EU, so that the VAT charged depended 
on the location of the selling business rather than the country of residence of 
the customer. This was intended to promote the Single Market by removing bar-
riers to inter-Member trading by businesses (under the destination principle the 
complications of dealing with multiple VAT systems depending on the customer‘s 
place of residence would be a serious administrative barrier, particularly for small 
businesses). However one consequence of a shift to an origin system would be 
that individuals in the EU would become able to travel to other EU Member Sta-
tes to make their purchases, pay the taxes of the country in which the purchase 
took place, and bring them back to their home country without paying any ad-
ditional tax. Moreover this right would be unrestricted; unlike the old system of 
„duty free allowances“, still used for purchases made outside the EU, this new 
Single Market system puts no limit on the amount of imports, provided they are 
for personal use rather than resale.
Governments with high levels of VAT were therefore worried about tax com-
petition if their citizens could shop in lower-tax countries. This was a serious 
concern: not only did the high-tax countries face the loss of consumption tax 
revenues, but also their domestic businesses would lose custom to suppliers in 
lower-taxed countries, having a knock-on effect on proﬁts tax and employment. 
The UK government has been less concerned, partly because its VAT rate is one 
of the lowest in Europe (at 17.5 %), but also because the only land border the UK 
has with another EU country is that between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland - hence transport costs will reduce the opportunities for most UK resi-
dents to take advantage of lower rates elsewhere.
However for high VAT countries, particularly those with extensive land bor-
ders with other, lower taxed, Member States, this tax competition was a serious 
concern. A compromise was therefore reached to restrict the Single Market: the 
ability to bring purchases back from other EU countries without paying tax on 
imports only applies if the individual physically travels to the other country, makes 
the purchase in person and brings the goods home himself (known as ‚personal 
import‘). It was felt that this was unlikely to result in high levels of tax compe-
tition in relation to VAT, because the tax differentials were not generally great 
enough to make physical travel worthwhile (especially as ‚big-ticket‘ items, such 
as cars, are excluded from this personal import regime).
Almost all other sales between different EU Member States are subject to the 
destination system, so that a company delivering goods to a consumer in another 
Member State must charge the VAT of the customer‘s country (with consequent 
administrative problems)20. This removes the possibility of tax competition, because 
the same VAT will be charged wherever the supplier is based.
This requirement for physical travel limits the effectiveness of tax competition; 
the maximum VAT saving for most goods within the EU is 10 % (Sweden‘s 25 % 
against Luxembourg‘s 15 %), and it was thought unlikely that signiﬁcant numbers 
of taxpayers would travel between countries for a 10 % VAT saving. There is of 
course a greater saving where some countries have reduced VAT rates for particular 
items, but here again the EU has attempted to harmonise and restrict the list of 
items to which these can be applied. However due to political pressures countries 
were able to retain existing reduced rates, or even super-reduced rates such as 
the UK‘s 0 % rate, for a range of product types, which widens the potential VAT 
saving to 25 %. The European Commission has been trying to restrict the scope of 
reduced rates, limiting them to areas where there is a social policy justiﬁcation, 
and it is now impossible to introduce new super-reduced rates (i.e. those below 
5 %), and other reduced rates are restricted to certain categories of goods.
At ﬁrst sight the scope for tax competition through reduced rates seems li-
mited by the type of product subject to reduced rates; the possibility of a 6 % 
VAT rate for hairdressing in Luxembourg, or bicycle repairs in the Netherlands, 
20  There is an exemption from this for very small businesses, to reﬂect the administrative difﬁculty 
of operating 25 different VAT systems, but the limit for this exemption is far too low.
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does not appear likely to result in signiﬁcant cross-border activity. However the 
European Commission‘s report on the issue (COM(2001) 599 ﬁnal) reveals some 
concern; „French representatives of biscuit, chocolate and confectionery manuf-
actures maintain that their products are suffering distortions of competition“ 
(particularly from Luxembourg, where the rate is just 3 %),21 and similar problems 
are reported concerning agricultural products. It is also possible that the UK‘s 
zero-ratings could enable tax competition, particularly medicines (where there 
is a growing international market), food (subject to cultural differences), books 
and children‘s clothes.
In this way the governments of the EU Member States restricted the Sing-
le Market and the free movement of goods to protect themselves from effecti-
ve consumption tax competition, and to reduce barriers to their ability to raise 
consumption taxes in the future. The only way to take advantage of lower con-
sumption taxes within the EU is to buy from a very small business (as these are 
exempt from the „distance selling“ rules and operate under the origin principle) 
or to physically travel to another country with either a lower general VAT rate or 
a speciﬁc reduced rate (in which case the costs and time would reduce any tax 
advantage).
Tax competition in VAT is therefore limited, making it easier for governments 
to increase VAT rates, but there remains real scope for widespread consumption 
tax competition in relation to products with speciﬁc high taxes, such as alcohol, 
tobacco and petrol, where domestic political pressures have so far prevented har-
monisation. The UK government for example loses substantial amounts of reve-
nue from cross-border purchases of alcohol and tobacco (estimated by Customs 
Associates Ltd for the European Commission at EURO 400 million p.a. in 2001), 
because it has set excise duties on these items at rates far higher than neighbou-
ring countries so that it is highly proﬁtable for British citizens to travel to France, 
Belgium or Spain to make these purchases.
21  COM(2001) 599 ﬁnal, footnote 14.
Expanding tax harmonisation in the European Union22
I - The Savings Tax Directive
In addition to its powers over VAT, the EU also has new powers to impose taxes 
on investments, through the ‚Savings Tax Directive‘. This is the widely reported 
process by which the EU governments are hoping to stop their citizens from shel-
tering their savings in low-tax countries.
Although defeated many times, the Directive was ﬁnally passed on 24th June 
2005,23 just before it came into force on 1st July 2005. Under this Directive all 
interest payments to EU residents will be subject to a minimum tax of 15 % for 
the ﬁrst 3 years of operation of the system, then 20 % (the international norm 
for tax deductions from bank interest) for the next 3 years, rising to a clearly pu-
nitive 35 % thereafter.24
Alternatively Member States can opt for a system of ‚automatic reporting‘, 
where the bank has to notify the amount of interest paid to the recipient‘s na-
tional tax authority so that they can tax it themselves. This would make it easy 
for the investor‘s home authority to impose tax, but would run against the tradi-
tion in many countries of protecting investors through client conﬁdentiality and 
banking secrecy.25
The European Commission had been pushing for such a scheme for 15 years, 
but the process was held up primarily by two members of the EU that effectively 
act as on-shore tax havens.
The ﬁrst, Luxembourg, has for its size a massive ﬁnancial services sector, fu-
elled by its tax exemptions for interest payments and its strong banking secre-
cy; its government was therefore unwilling to agree to anything that would risk 
losing any of this business. Indeed it was the loss of tax revenue to the German 
22  For a discussion of the wider implications of the EU‘s policy in this area, see Teather, R., „Death 
by Taxes“, Turks & Caicos Times of the Islands, Winter 2004/5.  Unfortunately my prediction in 
that article that the Savings Directive would not actually be passed was proved incorrect.
23  Council (ECOFIN) decision, document 10038/05 FISC 69.
24  The proceeds of this tax will be split, with 75 % going to the Member State where the investor 
is resident and the remaining 25 % retained by the country where the interest is paid.
25  Reporting also acts as tax harmonisation ‚by the back door‘, as it makes it impossible for many 
taxpayers to take advantage of lower tax rates on offer in other EU states.
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government through its citizens putting their money into Luxembourg banks (a 
process made easier by the removal of border controls in the EU, and by the in-
troduction of the Euro) that arguably started the whole process that ﬁnally led 
to this Directive.
Austria also has banking secrecy and is involved to a lesser extent in the same 
sort of ﬁnancial business as Luxembourg, and so had an interest in preventing 
the Directive, but a lesser one due to the lower relative importance of its ﬁnan-
cial sector.
The other major EU tax haven is the UK, whose massive $3 trillion Eurobond 
market is tax-free. This allows multinational corporations to issue bonds, traded 
on the London Stock Exchange, and pay interest without any requirement to de-
duct withholding tax. Clearly this enables companies (mainly but not exclusively 
US and Japanese) to borrow money more cheaply by paying interest to investors 
gross (particularly if the investors avoid tax on their interest receipts in their home 
country), and so promotes the investment needed to generate employment and 
wealth. The existence of this market in London brings much wealth to the UK, 
particularly highly paid ﬁnancial sector jobs, associated legal and accountancy 
work, and rents and taxes paid by banks and traders.
For both of these countries therefore, the Savings Tax Directive could dama-
ge their national economies; both the Luxembourg bank deposits and the Lon-
don Eurobond market are attractive primarily because they are tax-free. It is true 
that both countries also have reasonably efﬁcient banking and dealing sectors, 
but no more than many other jurisdictions, so if tax had to be imposed becau-
se of the EU then there would be no particular reason for this activity to stay in 
either country.
This relocation risk was one of the strongest arguments used by the UK and 
Luxembourg against the Directive. In today‘s integrated world ﬁnancial markets 
bank deposits are clearly highly mobile, and so the Savings Tax Directive could do 
only harm, not good; if all savings within the EU are taxed then investors would 
simply move their money outside. The EU would therefore lose valuable ﬁnancial 
sector business and the related income (and employment), but without collecting 
signiﬁcantly more tax.
This capital market mobility is not just a theory; the London Eurobond market 
was initially formed in 1964 when the USA started levying tax on bond interest, 
and corporate borrowing (and the associated trading) was swiftly relocated to 
London. Market mobility is if anything even greater than it was in the 1960s, so 
26  One of the concessions was an exemption from the new rules for existing Eurobonds; this was 
essential as many of them included a clause for automatic redemption if withholding taxes were 
ever imposed, a factor that proves the importance of the tax exemptions to market location.
the loss of the Eurobond markets if a withholding tax were levied would be very 
rapid.
Indeed there is evidence that capital ﬂight has begun; the Hong Kong Securi-
ties & Futures Commission reported that in 2003 investments in collective invest-
ment schemes soared by 56 % after years of relatively stable growth. Although the 
source of these inﬂowing funds is unknown there is speculation that it represents 
European capital moving out before the Directive was implemented.
In the European Union tax measures can only be imposed by unanimous agree-
ment of all Member State governments, which means that Luxembourg and the 
UK could, and did, veto early moves to introduce the savings directive. However 
after several years of strong pressure they extracted valuable concessions and 
ﬁnally gave way26.
One important concession was that the Savings Tax Directive was conditional 
on its rules also being accepted by various non-EU countries, to ensure that there 
was nowhere for these markets to move to. Speciﬁcally it had to cover:
• The main non-EU European tax havens:
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra; and
• ‚Dependent or associated territories‘ of EU members:
 the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, and the UK‘s 
dependencies in the Caribbean.
Although the EU has no formal jurisdiction over these countries, it clearly 
believed that it could pressure them into agreeing to its demands, either due to 
geographic proximity or political or economic ties. In the end this proved to be 
correct; the dependent territories eventually all agreed to participate, after pres-
sure from the UK Treasury that even the UK‘s Foreign & Commonwealth Ofﬁce 
regarded as excessive.
For a while after the Directive was passed, it was therefore widely believed 
that it was an irrelevance because the process was conditional on Switzerland 
also agreeing. The Swiss government was thought to be unlikely to ever agree to 
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anything that might damage its international banking sector. However the Swiss 
were put under intolerable pressure, particularly by Germany (which was losing 
the most under the old system through its citizens investing in Luxembourg banks) 
introducing excessive customs checks and administrative inconveniences in an 
attempt to practically close the Swiss border (the Spanish have been using similar 
tactics against Gibraltar).
Finally in June 2004 the Swiss government, after extracting other (primarily 
non-tax) concessions from the European Union, agreed to sign up to the Directi-
ve, and in June 2005 the European Union members (in the Council of Ministers) 
accepted the 15 bi-lateral agreements and gave the ‚green light‘ for the Directive 
to come into force, just in time for its due date of 1st July.
Those new Member States from Eastern Europe, such as Estonia, who have 
celebrated their escape from communism by repositioning themselves as low-tax 
dynamic economies, may now ﬁnd their renaissance damaged through having 
allowed the EU to reverse this policy by imposing Europe-wide taxes.
So far the Directive seems to have had only a limited effect, because in its 
current form it is full of loopholes and should be easily avoidable; indeed the 
Swiss have dubbed it the „fools‘ tax“ because only those who do not take proper 
advice will be harmed by it. However this depends on how it is interpreted and 
implemented; since the primary duty of the European Court of Justice is to ad-
vance European integration (rather than to determine the meaning of new laws), 
there is a real danger that future disputes on the application of the Directive will 
see a widening of its scope, and a reduction in the opportunities for avoidance, 
by the Court.
The Directive is therefore a powerful tool for EU governments, once again 
weakening the barriers to future tax rises and leaving taxpayers unprotected.
27  European values in the globalised world, Communication from the Commission, COM (2005) 
525 (ﬁnal), Brussels, 20th October 2005.
28  Ruding, „Report of the committee of independent experts on company taxation“, Commission 
of the European Communities, March 1992
Expanding tax harmonisation in the European Union
II - Company taxation
The taxation of companies is another important area where the EU has been in-
terested in harmonisation. Business is thought to be more geographically mobile 
than individuals, and therefore there is a serious risk that they will migrate away 
from high-tax countries, which will lose not only the direct tax revenues on busi-
ness proﬁts but also the employment that those businesses provided. With un-
employment in the EU now at 19 million27 (plus much disguised unemployment 
in government ‚job-creation‘ schemes), it appears that this process may have 
already begun.
The EU has been examining the possibility of corporate tax harmonisation 
for many years, most notably in 199228, but it is only recently that any concrete 
progress has been made.
In general the EU‘s activity in the corporate ﬁeld has been more subtle than in 
other areas, and is even capable of doing some good in that it corrects the natu-
ral tendencies of politicians to meddle with their tax systems to favour particular 
client groups. This ‚corporate welfare‘, the state beneﬁts given by politicians to 
particular industries, has recently started attracting more critical attention.
Clearly it is economically foolish for governments to tax successful busines-
ses to fund unsuccessful ones: the successful activities will have their expansion 
hampered by high taxes whilst unsuccessful businesses will expand beyond the 
point at which the cost of their activities is equal to the beneﬁt. Sadly howe-
ver corporate welfare remains popular, particularly because politicians insist on 
believing that they have a particular insight that allows them to ‚pick winners‘ 
which have unfairly been denied funding by bankers and other ﬁnancers. Effec-
tively this is another manifestation of the persistent belief in State planning over 
the market. In addition it is another way in which politicians can divert resources 
to their client groups in the electorate, funding increased employment in their 
constituencies at the cost of slowing down the general economy.
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The European Commission has, to its credit, taken action against this tenden-
cy (although political action between Member State governments has sometimes 
made it less effective) through the rules against ‚State Aid‘. Initially these rules 
were only used against direct subsidies, but in 2001 the Commission began to 
use the state aid rules to stop tax breaks for speciﬁc business sectors. Its greatest 
achievement was the abolition of the Irish International Financial Services Centre 
(IFSC) regime, under which companies based in the Dublin docklands and opera-
ting in the ﬁnancial services sector were only subject to a 10 % tax rate rather 
than the 30 % then levied on other Irish companies.
The European Commission successfully argued that the Irish IFSC regime 
amounted to illegal State Aid, because offering a tax reduction to a particular 
industry was effectively equivalent to a government grant to that industry.29 Ho-
wever there is a limit to the use that can be made of such provisions; the Irish 
government‘s response was to replace the special reduced 10 % rate of tax for 
particular industries with a general low tax rate of 12 % for all companies, which 
is immune from challenge under the state aid rules because it is not targeted at 
speciﬁc industries.
An additional strand of the EU‘s moves against tax breaks for speciﬁc indus-
tries is its Code of Conduct for business taxation, which was agreed to in 1997 as 
part of a package of measures that included the Savings Tax Directive.
The Group reported in 1999, and had as its basis a similar objective to the 
OECD, to address „those measures which affect, or may affect, in a signiﬁcant way 
the location of business activity in the Community“. However Member States were 
keen to protect their independent authority to set their own tax rates, so measures 
were only to be examined if they led to „a signiﬁcantly lower effective level of ta-
xation ... than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in question“. 
In other words it was a similar approach to the use of the state aid rules; Member 
States were free to adopt general low levels of taxation, but not low rates (or low 
effective rates) for particular classes of business operations.
Again, like the Savings Directive, the Code was to be extended to associa-
ted and dependent territories of EU Member States because of the risk of simply 
30  Most of the jurisdictions only had speciﬁc aspects of their tax systems listed as being potentially 
harmful; Sark was treated as harmful in its entirety.
moving tax avoidance outside the EU. It did not however extend to independent 
jurisdictions such as Switzerland.
The Group‘s report in 1999 identiﬁed 203 separate regimes within Member 
States that were potentially harmful, plus a further 86 in the dependent and as-
sociated territories (including the island of Sark, whose mere existence seemed 
to be regarded as an abusive tax practice30).
The Code is intended to lead to a „standstill and rollback“ process, where ﬁrstly 
no new abusive regimes were to be introduced and then existing ones were to be 
progressively abolished (with a transitional period in which regimes were to be 
closed to new entrants but existing beneﬁciaries were allowed to continue).
The practical implementation of the Code of Conduct has two of the problems 
associated with the OECD‘s action against its own members‘ tax exemptions: it 
is a voluntary process with no enforcement powers, and it is a political process 
with no objective judicial arm to decide what practices constitute harmful tax 
competition (as a voluntary agreement between Member States‘ governments the 
European Court of Justice has no role). However the Code is expected to become 
more powerful over time.
The Code of Conduct process may appear to be generally beneﬁcial, as it mainly 
attacks economically foolish tax policies that beneﬁt politically favoured busines-
ses at the expense of the general economy.  However it shares the problem of all 
harmonisation, that it prevents choice and experiment, and the requirement for 
unanimity in tax matters means that proposals, once agreed, become ﬁxed and 
increasingly inﬂexible. The EU may therefore ﬁnd itself unable, as well as unwilling, 
to make the necessary adaptations to future changes in world conditions.
29  It also took similar action against other governments, including Spain‘s whose co-ordination 
centres in the Basque region were allowed to calculate their taxable proﬁts on a non-commercial 
basis so that although the headline tax rate was the same as for other companies their taxable 
proﬁts, and hence their effective tax rate, was artiﬁcially low.  Similar regimes in Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg and Germany were also targeted.
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Does tax harmonisation matter?31
Of course one potential answer is that tax harmonisation does not matter; the EU 
has many powers, and imposing taxes is just one other.
Historically tax does matter; „no taxation without representation“, the need 
for democratic consent to a tax, is a common theme of revolt against autocratic 
governments, and it was a sound practical understanding of power that put con-
trol over taxes at the heart of democratic sovereignty. Now that taxes can be im-
posed at the EU level, against the will of future democratically elected national 
governments,32 then sovereignty has been transferred. This may be supported or 
opposed, but we should no longer pretend that it has not happened.
The imposition of minimum taxes at the EU level also raises wider issues. The 
minimum tax rates are part of a move towards tax harmonisation, the equalisati-
on (or approximation) of tax rates across the EU. The motive for this is to reduce 
tax competition, the ability of national governments to improve their economies 
by reducing their tax rates and so attracting business activity and investment. 
Once tax competition is restricted or made more efﬁcient, the EU Member State 
governments are free to introduce the tax increases that they see as necessary 
for their desire to retain the ‚European Social Model‘.
This tax competition has been a great beneﬁt. The increase of the global 
market, especially the moves towards free capital markets following the ending 
of wartime exchange controls in the 1980s, enabled investors to take advantage 
of lower tax rates around the world, and the fear of capital ﬂight forced govern-
ments to reduce their punitive tax rates. This beneﬁt has even been acknowledged 
by the OECD:
„The more open and competitive environment of the last decades has had 
many positive effects on tax systems, including the reduction of tax rates and 
broadening of tax bases which have characterized tax reforms over the last 15 
years. In part these developments can be seen as a result of competitive forces 
that have encouraged countries to make their tax systems more attractive to 
investors. In addition to lowering overall tax rates, a competitive environment 
can promote greater efﬁciency in government expenditure programs.“33
33  „The OECD‘s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report“, OECD, Paris (2001) 
paragraph 1.
34  See Teather, R., „Multinational Tax Competition - a legal and economic perspective“, paper 
presented at the Tax Research Network conference, Cambridge University, September 2002.
35  For a summary of recent studies, see „The negative impact of taxation on economic growth“, 
Leach, Reform (London), September 2003.
36 Boadway, Cuff & Marceau, „Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms: Jobs as vehicles for 
Redistribution“, University of Quebec, 1999.
31  For an expanded analysis of this point, see Teather, R. „Harmful Tax Competition“, Economic 
Affairs, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 58-63 [2002].
32  Albeit accepted by an earlier national government.
Tax competition therefore acts as a restraint on individual governments‘ ability 
to raise taxes; politicians still face demands from their electorates for improved 
public services, but if these cannot be met through increased taxation they are 
forced to make the public sector more efﬁcient and better directed. Tax competi-
tion therefore increases public welfare, by reducing waste and inefﬁciencies and 
allowing public goods to be provided at a lower cost. Indeed international tax 
competition is essential because, unlike other sectors of the economy, there are 
few other effective constraints on government inefﬁciencies.34
There are other knock-on beneﬁts of tax competition; by acting as a restraint 
on governments‘ ability to raise taxes, and so keeping taxes lower than they would 
otherwise be, tax competition promotes capital investment and encourages busi-
ness activity. The effect of taxes on economic growth is difﬁcult to quantify, but 
long-term comparative studies have suggested that each 1 % of GDP taken in tax 
reduces growth rates by between 0.2 % and 0.4 %.35  This may not sound like much, 
but that is an annual loss; over 25 years the cumulative effect of a tax reduction 
of just 3 % of GDP would be a national economy around 30 % larger than it would 
otherwise have been, with a resultant increase in employment and wages.
Numerous academic studies have been made into the harm or otherwise of 
tax competition, many of them focused on federal structures, real or imaginary, 
and so appropriate to the EU situation. However, although most of these studies 
concluded that tax competition is harmful, they are generally coloured by their 
underlying assumptions and are challenged by more recent work.
A few of the assumptions of these studies are so bizarre that, although often 
needed to simplify the mathematics enough to make the equations solvable, they 
risk invalidating the entire study. One for example assumes that the number of 
active entrepreneurs in the economy is a constant,36 despite the wide debate on 
the effect of taxation policies on the number of business start-ups.  Many make 
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the similar, often unstated, assumption that the amount of investment capital 
available is similarly invariable, despite the evidence that the availability of lower 
tax rates increases savings and therefore capital and the fact that one of the pur-
poses of tax havens is to increase the available capital by allowing it to be pooled 
from a variety of countries without imposing an additional layer of tax.37
In the EU situation this assumption that investment capital is ﬁxed causes 
even more problems; although the EU may occasionally act as if there is no world 
outside its borders, it is in reality part of a global economy and therefore its tax 
policies can cause capital ﬂight out to the rest of the world.38
Largely the studies result in the conclusion that tax competition is inefﬁcient,39 
distortionary, inequitable or generally welfare minimising,40 as it leads to reduced 
revenues for governments and therefore reduced welfare spending. However this 
is based on the questionable assumption that government revenues automatically 
result in public welfare. This means that these studies all share a fundamental 
(sometimes even unspoken) assumption of the efﬁciency of government spending. 
Their authors believe that „levels of taxation and public goods provision within 
jurisdictions are settled by majority voting“,41 and taxation is transformed into 
the provision of public goods without loss or waste.
Recently a few writers have challenged this assumption, concluding that the 
effect of tax competition on public welfare is „ambiguous“42 because a proportion 
of the beneﬁts of taxation are lost through „waste and inefﬁciencies in the public 
37  For evidence on this point see the UK parliament‘s Treasury Select Committee‘s Examination of 
Witnesses, Hansard, 2nd May 1999.
38  Equally important is the action of some EU governments who are trying to use the OECD to 
prevent tax competition in the wider world. This ‚Harmful Tax Competition‘ initiative is not 
covered in this paper, as it is an action by individual EU governments rather than an EU process. 
Readers who are interested in the OECD point may wish to see Teather, R., „Tax Competition“, 
published by the Institute of Economic Affairs, December 2005.
39  See for example „Corporate Income Tax Competition, Double Taxation Treaties and Foreign 
Direct Investment“, Janeba, Journal of Public Economics, 1995.
40  For a comprehensive over-view, see „Capital income taxation in Europe: trends and trade-offs“, 
Gorter & Mooij, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
41  „Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices“, Perroni (University 
of Warwick) & Scharf (Institute for Fiscal Studies), 1996.
42  „Capital Tax Competition with Inefﬁcient Government Spending“, Eggert, Centre of Finance and 
Econometrics discussion paper, Konstanz University, 1999. Keen has also written in a similar 
vein.
sector“,43 but their work is generally dismissed due to lack of quantiﬁablity.44 In 
contrast Public Choice theory, the analysis of government action by subjecting it 
to the same processes as we would the actions of private persons, opposes the 
view of taxation as necessarily beneﬁcial45 and points out that governments are 
composed of and operated not by machines but by individuals, whose livelihoods 
and inﬂuence are generally dependent on the increase in government power and 
activity; governments are therefore run by people who have a vested interest in 
the increase of government.
In fact there is no causal link between increased taxation and increased public 
welfare.46 The inefﬁcient conversion of government inputs (taxation) to outputs 
(valued public services) is caused not only by pure inefﬁciencies (such as over-
manning and under-use of capital resources) but also by diversion (spending on 
outputs that are not sufﬁciently valued by the public).
Modern governments tend to have their own bureaucratic growth that politi-
cians can rarely tackle in more than a few isolated areas,47 and in a supranational 
system such as the EU this process is potentially even stronger, as the increased 
distance between the electorate and the government weakens the democratic 
controls and increases the opportunities for waste and self-enrichment.48
Tax competition is therefore beneﬁcial in checking the trend of bureaucracies 
to open-ended growth, and forcing efﬁciency savings. However a process that is 
beneﬁcial to citizens it is not necessarily one that is attractive to governments.
43  „Do We Need Tax Harmonisation in the EU?“, Boss, Kiel Institute of World Economics working 
papers, 1999.
44  See Gorter & Mooij (above), pg 58.
45  Buchanan is the main exponent of Public Choice theory; it is therefore unsurprising that he 
was one of the signatories of a letter to President Bush opposing the OECD tax harmonisation 
initiative.
46  Public welfare in this case must be deﬁned as the value citizens receive from government 
activities, not the cost of such provision; a valuation of outputs rather than a summation of 
input costs.
47  „It takes a very strong Secretary of State to resist recommendations from civil servants even 
though these are often quite narrowly founded“, Alan Clark (former UK government minister), 
quoted in his „Diaries“, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London (1993).
48  See „The Theory of Public Choice: Federalism“, Tullock, 2000.
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European politicians are currently feeling trapped between their political desire 
to preserve the ‚European Social Model‘ and the resistance of their citizens to pay 
any more tax.49 The political class has rejected the option of fundamental reform, 
and therefore tax rises are needed to cope with increasing unemployment and an 
ageing population. Of course high taxes damage investment and entrepreneur-
ship, reduce economic activity and jobs and ultimately make the whole country 
poorer, but the general fear amongst EU governments about the collapse of the 
Social Model, and their need of ever-increasing revenues to attempt to prop it up, 
leads them to a dangerous short-term view.
Conclusions
As a matter of law and constitutional principle, the EU has already taken tax rai-
sing powers, and can impose taxes against the will of a democratically elected 
national parliament through lasting minimum tax rates.
These powers are not just theoretical, but have been exercised; EU-imposed 
taxes have long been the norm for VAT, and (since 1st July 2005) they now also 
cover investment income and are expanding into general business taxes.
This is not just a constitutional or political argument, but a practical and eco-
nomic one. Imposing taxes in the EU can cause capital ﬂight to non-EU countries,50 
reducing investment in Europe.
Furthermore competition between countries for investment has kept taxes lo-
wer than they would otherwise have been; harmonisation or minimum tax levels 
across the EU would stiﬂe this competition and allow governments more freedom 
to raise tax levels. This would tend to lower investment and damage the economy, 
with consequent damage to jobs and wages.
The driver for this change is the problem of the Social Model. This is increasingly 
threatened by choice and inter-jurisdictional competition, as both businesses and 
qualiﬁed individuals leave the EU for more appropriate social regimes. This gives 
rise to a need for increased revenues in an attempt to maintain the Social Model 
49  In the UK for example, government advisers now believe that tax levels above 43 % of GDP 
(only just above the current levels) will seriously damage their electoral prospects.
50  Although the EU is hoping to minimise this effect by having forced other countries to sign up 
to its proposals, this is not an exhaustive process and there will still be many countries outside 
the scheme.
in an era of rising unemployment and ageing populations, and so governments 
see tax competition as a barrier to their ability to increase taxes.
Future generations, and the new EU entrants, could see themselves bound in 
to the higher tax rates needed to fund the welfare states and pension obligations 
of Old Europe; their prosperity would be better served by a more ﬂexible approach. 
Even Old Europe would be better served by tax competition, by adopting a model 
based on wealth generation for all rather than redistribution.
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